Michigan Firearm Preemption Law

MCL 123.1102

Analysis of Scope

Copyright August 1999, Michigan Partnership to Prevent Gun Violence

Prepared by: Garry Goolsby, J.D.

• Introduction
• Background
• National Decisions
• Preemption in Other States
• Preemption in Michigan
• Michigan Firearm Preemption
• Appendices

Introduction

In 1990, the Michigan legislature enacted MCL 123.1102 which provides, in pertinent part:

AA local unit of government shall not impose special taxation on, enact or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols or other firearms, ammunition for pistols or other firearms, or components of pistols or other firearms, except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state.@

A review of the legislative process of this matter reveals very little in respect to legislative history. The House Legislative Analysis Section=s second analysis, dated January 3, 1991 - after the bill was enrolled - indicated the apparent problem was:

ACurrently local units of government have the authority to enact and enforce gun control ordinances. Recently, the cities of Flint and Ann Arbor narrowly defeated gun control ordinances, and reportedly, there is a proliferation of local regulation regarding firearm ownership, sale and possession, including ordinances in effect in Detroit and East Lansing. The narrow defeat of these ordinances has resulted in concern that continued local authority to enact and enforce gun control ordinances may result in the establishment of a patchwork of ordinances. Many fear that the enactment of several gun control ordinances will make it hard for officers to enforce the laws and that gun enthusiasts will be unfairly prosecuted for not knowing the laws and the areas to which they apply.@

As House Bill 5437 worked its way through the House of Representatives, no statements of either the proponents or the opponents of the bill were printed in the House Journal. The bill passed the House on November 29, 1990 by a vote of 73-7. On December 4, 1990, the Senate referred the bill to the Committee of the Whole, by-passing the standing committee which normally would have considered the matter. The Senate then passed the bill on the same day by a vote of 26-7. There were no statements by the proponents of the legislation included in the Senate Journal. Senator Joe Conroy protested to the passage of the Legislation on the basis that training requirements and State Police checks included in the House version were excluded in the Senate.

The Senate sent the bill back to the House on December 4, 1990 with amendments. On December 5, 1990, the House granted the Senate's request for the return of the bill. On the same day, apparently to avoid a conference committee to resolve the differences between the two houses, the Senate reconsidered its previous vote; tied-barred HB 5437 to House Bills 6009 and 6010 and then passed the bill 23-10. HB 6009 required training and police checks. HB 6010 modified the Penal Code to add certain violations and to provide criminal penalties for violation of the state's gun laws.

Senator Lana Pollack protested the passage of the bill because "this puts all sorts of prohibitions on local units of government so that the current Detroit law, for instance, would be made null and void with the passage of this. Certain ordinances in East Lansing, for instance, would be made null and void." Senator William Faust also protested the passage of the bill:

"I voted 'no' on House Bill No. 5437 because two communities in the twelfth district, two suburbs, all-white communities, by the way, have banned semi-automatic weapons under local ordinances. This bill now says that those laws have no force and effect when the local people put them into effect, and I did not think it was right that we preempted that right from the locals."

Finally, Senator Jack Faxon also explained his no vote:

"I, too, voted against this bill for the reasons that we have stated in the past, and that is that some of our cities and communities around this state would like to take stronger measures with regard to the control of firearms. It may be that the Constitution has certain protections about what people have a right to bear, but the society also has a right to protect itself by imposing appropriate rules, regulations and laws that govern its use, misuse and abuse. Local units of government that wish to step forward and take the appropriate steps in order to accomplish those objections should not be deterred by the actions of this state that would supersede that opportunity. I do believe that local units of government that are willing to do this should not have lost that opportunity through this legislation."

I have been asked to determine whether, in light of the legislation, a local unit of government may enact any local ordinances regarding firearms. I have also been asked to survey the status of each states' law firearm preemption law; the interpretations that similar statutes have received in other states; a discussion of case law throughout the country; an in depth look at the Michigan law and how other preemption issues in Michigan have been handled by the courts; and finally a conclusion regarding this subject matter.

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Background

As of this writing, 40 states have some form of preemption laws regarding the possession and ownership of firearms. In the majority of the states, the legislature has unequivocally expressed its intent to occupy the entire area of regulation of firearms.

In other states, the preemption is clearly partial: Alaska, California, Delaware, Maryland, Montana, and Washington.

The following states have no firearm preemption laws: Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio.

National Decisions

While this brief's focus is on state preemption of local firearms ordinances, it is worth while to place some focus, for background purposes, on the meaning of the term "right to bear arms." While the United States Supreme Court has never ruled the Second Amendment of the Constitution applies to state limitations, most states have a state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms. It should be noted that a recent case in the United States Fifth Circuit District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Criminal Action No. 66:98-CR-103-C, defendant Timothy Joe Emerson was indicted for possession of a firearm while being under a restraining order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8). The case involved a divorce action. United States District Judge Sam R. Cummings, who found Second Amendment rights to be an individual liberty, found the statute unconstitutional "because it allows a state court divorce proceeding, without particularized findings of the threat of future violence, to automatically deprive a citizen of his Second Amendment rights." U.S. v Emerson ___ F.Supp ___ (N.D. Tex, 1999).

The Judge further explained his reasoning in his March 30, 1999 opinion and order:

"If the statute only criminalized gun possession based upon court orders with particularized findings of the likelihood of violence, then the statute would not be so offensive, because there would be a reasonable nexus between gun possession and the threat of violence. However, the statute is infirm because it allows one to be subject to federal felony prosecution if the order merely 'prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against [an] intimate partner.' 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

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It is absurd that a boilerplate state court divorce order can collaterally and automatically extinguish a law-abiding citizen's Second Amendment rights, particularly when neither the judge issuing the order, nor the parties nor their attorneys are aware of the federal criminal penalties arising from firearm possession after entry of a restraining order. That such a routine civil order has such extensive consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes the statute unconstitutional. There must be a limit to government regulation on unlawful firearm possession. This statute exceeds that limit, and therefore is unconstitutional."

The case may eventually make its way to the United States Supreme Court and will be worth following because of the issues raised. This case dove tails into United States v Verdugo-Urquirdez, 110 S. Ct. 3039 (1990) wherein the Supreme Court held that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment had the same meaning as in the Constitution's Preamble and in the First, Fourth and Ninth Amendments. Given the Supreme Court's opinion, they may well find that the right to bear arms is an individual right if Emerson, supra ever gets to the Court. Such a holding could substantially change the Court's view of regulation concerning firearms.

While an entire paper could be devoted to the individual state court's interpretation of the "right to bear arms", this brief will compare Oregon and Michigan just to provide a sense of how the court's interpret the provision.

A look a Oregon's Supreme Court interpretation of that state's 1859 Constitution is interesting not only from a historical perspective, but also from the perspective of what weapons are covered in that Court's opinion. Article 1, section 27 of the Oregon Constitution states:

"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defense (sic) of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power."

In State v Kessler, 289 Or 359, 368-69 (1980), a case involving the possession of two billy clubs, the Oregon Supreme Court considered the scope of the state's Constitutional provision for the first time. The Court, citing People v Brown, 253 Mich 537 (1931), and law journals articles detailing the history of the evolution of such right, opened the right to bear arms for defense of the state "likely refers to the historical preference for a citizen militia rather than a standing army..." At 366. In regards to "defense of self", the Court noted the right to self-defense was "recognized as a privilege in both civil and criminal laws since about 1400 in England and at all times in the United State." At 367.

The right to bear arms in Oregon was interpreted as covering weapons used by post-revolutionary era settlers for military purposes, and their modern-day equivalents:

"In the colonial and revolutionary war era, weapons used by militia men and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.

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"[Therefore, the term 'arms' as used by drafters of the constitutions probably was intended to include those weapons used by settlers for both personal and military defense."

The court explained why the possession of a billy club at home was protected:

"Our historical analysis of Article I, section 27, indicates that the drafters intended 'arms' to include the hand-carried weapons commonly used by individuals for personal defense. The club is an effective hand-carried weapon which cannot logically be excluded from this term."

In 1981, the Court held that the possession of a billy club outside the home was also constitutionally protected. State v Blocker, 291 Or. 255 (1981). Ironically, Brown, supra, the Michigan case cited by the Oregon Supreme Court involved the possession of a billy club, a weapon the Michigan Court has concluded can be banned, as explained below.

In State v Delgado, 298 Or 395 (1984), a case involving the defendant's conviction for the possession of a switch-blade knife, the Court interpreted the right to bear arms to guarantee the "kind of weapon, as modified by its modern design and function, *** of the sort commonly used by individuals for personal defense during either the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, or in 1859 when Oregon's constitution was adopted." At 400-401.

The Court explained why possession of the switch-blade was protected:

"We are unconvinced by the state's argument that the switch-blade is so 'substantially different from its historical antecedent' (the jackknife) that it could not have been within the contemplation of the constitutional drafters. They must have been aware that technological changes were occurring in weaponry as in tools generally. The format and efficiency of weaponry was proceeding apace. This was the period of development of the Gatling gun, breach loading rifles, metallic cartridges and repeating rifles. The addition of a spring to open the blade of a jackknife is hardly a more astonishing innovation than those just mentioned."

The Court did stress while the Legislature could regulate the possession and use of such weapons, the mere possession, without more, was constitutionally protected.

In People v Zerillo, 219 Mich 635 (1922), the Michigan Supreme Court ruled "while the Legislature has power in the most comprehensive manner to regulate the carrying and use of firearms, that body has no power to constitute it a crime for a person, alien or citizen, to possess a revolver for the legitimate defense of himself and his property." In Brown, supra, Bernard Brown was convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon- a rifle - and of possessing and having in possession a blackjack. Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1929, Comp. Laws 1929, 16751 prohibited the possession of a billy club among other things. He appealed arguing his convictions were invalid in light of section 5, art 2, of the State Constitution which read:

"Every person has a right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state"

The Court rejected his argument in ruling the statute prohibiting the possession of a billy club did not violate the state's constitutional right to bear arms, stating:

"The police power of the state to preserve public safety and peace and to regulate the bearing of arms cannot fairly be restricted to the mere establishment of conditions under which all sorts of weapons may be privately possessed, but it may take account of the character and ordinary use of weapons and interdict those whose customary employment by individuals is to violate the law. The power is, of course, subject to the limitation that its exercise be reasonable, and it cannot constitutionally result in the prohibition of the possession of those arms which, by the common opinion and usage of law-abiding people, are proper and legitimate to be kept upon private premises for the protection of person and property."

Thus, while the state court's interpretation is that there is a right to "bear arms", what weapon is covered varies from state to state, Importantly, however, is the fact that each has found that the right is subject to the police power of the state. The rub, of course, is determining in each state how far that police power may go. With this background, we turn our attention to the primary focus of this paper firearm preemption statutes. We first look at statutes from other states.

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While the vast majority of states with firearm preemption laws have no cases interpreting that particular section of law, a few state courts have addressed the issue. However, before addressing those cases, it is important to note that general preemption principles apply to firearms as they do to any other area of law. However, in this section, only cases involving the various state's preemption statutes regarding firearms are reviewed.

In Quilici v Village of Morton Grove, 695 F. 2d 261 (1982), the federal appeals court affirmed the federal district court's determination that the Village of Morton Grove's ordinance prohibiting the possession of certain handguns within its' borders was constitutional.

The district court ruled the ordinance was a valid exercise of the village's police power and that it did not conflict with the State of Illinois' constitutional provision - Ill. Const. art 1, 22 - granting a conditional right to keep and bear arms. Quilici v Village of Morten Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The district court further concluded the second amendments guarantee of the right to bear arms had not been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and that the ninth amendment does not include the right to possess handguns for self-defense.

A number of states filed amici curiae briefs contending the district court should not have interpreted a state constitutional provision where the state court had not yet interpreted the provision in question. However, the appeals court rejected the states' contentions.

Ill. Const. art. 1, section 22 states:

"Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

The appeals court determined that the type of "arms" the Illinois constitutional framers had in mind included handguns because the constitutional convention debates referred to Brown, supra, and State v Duke, 42 Tex 455, 458 (1875).

The appeals court agreed with the district court's finding that the right to bear arms in Illinois is limited by the police power and that a ban on handguns does not violate that right.

Given the fact Illinois has no preemption law, the Illinois home rule units provision of the state constitution applies. Ill. Const. Art. VII, 6(a) provides:

"A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units. Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license, to tax and to incur debt."

In Pennsylvania, Philadelphia passed an ordinance, approved by the mayor on June 17, 1993, regulating the ownership of assault weapons. A city councilman filed for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the Commonwealth's preemption of the Philadelphia regulation and to declare the state's action to be in violation of the state's constitution , the home rule charter and the Home Rule Enabling Act, 53 Pa. C.S. 13101 et seq. The City of Pittsburgh which passed a similar ordinance in November, 1993 intervened after oral argument. The matter was subsequently dismissed. An appeal followed. Ortiz v Com., 545 Pa. 279 (1996).

Article 9, Section 2 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides the basis for home rule charters. However, in pertinent part it reads:

A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time. (italics added)

Following the enactment of the two ordinances, Pennsylvania's General Assembly passed House Bill 185, amending Title 18 of the Crimes Code, including the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. 6101-6124. The amendment appears at 18 Pa.C.S. 6120 and provides:

(a) General rule. - No county, municipality or township may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of firearms, ammunition or ammunition components when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth.

(b) Definition. - For the purpose of this section, the term "firearms" has the meaning given in section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of paramilitary training) but shall not include "air rifles" as defined in section 6304 (relating to sale and use of air rifles).

One argument the cities raised was that the power of home rule municipalities may be restricted only when the General Assembly enacts statutes on matters of statewide concern. The Court agreed with the parties premise, but stated that the issue of firearm regulation is such an issue, citing Article 1, Section 21 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which provides:

The Court explained:

"Because the ownership of firearms is constitutionally protected, its regulation is a matter of statewide concern. The constitution does not provide that the right to bear arms shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth except Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where it may be abridged at will, but that shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth. Thus, regulation of firearms is a matter of concern in all of Pennsylvania, not merely in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and the General Assembly, not city councils, is the proper forum for the imposition of such regulation."

In Hilly v City of Portland, 582 A 2d. 1213 (Me. 1990), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered whether the concealed firearms statute, 25 M.R.S.A. 2001-2006 was constitutional. The Court also considered whether the City of Portland's denial of plaintiff's renewal application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon was legal.

The firearm preemption statute, Chapter 252-A, 2011 reads as follows:

"1. Preemption. The State intends to occupy and preempt the entire field of legislation concerning the regulation of firearms, components, ammunition and supplies. Except as provided in subsection 3, any existing or future order, ordinance, rule or regulation in this field of any political subdivisions of the State is void.

"2. Regulation restricted. Except as provided in subsection 3, no political subdivision of the State, including, but not limited to, municipalities, counties, townships and village corporations, may adopt any order, ordinance, rule or regulation concerning the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting, registration, taxation or any other matter pertaining to firearms, components, ammunition or supplies.

"3. Exception. This section does not prohibit an order, ordinance, rule or regulation of any political subdivision which, with the exception of appropriate civil penalty provisions, conforms exactly with any applicable provision of state law or which regulates the discharge of firearms within a jurisdiction."

By way of background, James Hilly was the director of the Regional Transportation System and had previously held a concealed weapons permit. In the Spring of 1989, he completed only those portions of the application which he believed were required by the statute. When his application was denied, he filed suit claiming, among other things, that any state or local gun control legislation was unconstitutional and, in the alternative, that his application was constructively complete because the state had preempted the field of gun control. . He also sought an injunction against the city's enforcement of its ordinance that prohibited the carrying of firearms at night.

The State of Maine's preemption law became effective September 30, 1989. Hilly sought to amend his complaint to reflect the change in state law, but was denied the opportunity by the lower court.

The Court noted it previously held the state's constitutional right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation consistent with the State's police power to promote public health, welfare, safety, and morality. State v Brown 571 A.2d 816 (Me. 1990). Noting a number of other courts have found regulation of concealed weapons are constitutional on public safety grounds, court stated:

Similarly, Maine's concealed firearms statute is a reasonable response to the justifiable public safety concern engendered by the carrying of concealed firearms. The permit requirements pass constitutional muster as an acceptable regulation of the individual's right to keep and bear arms.

Regarding plaintiff's contention that the night time carrying ban violated state law, the court noted the state law did preempt that issue and the City of Portland had filed an affidavit disavowing any intent to take any action in violation of the statute. Accordingly, the issue of preemption regarding that matter became moot in the court's opinion.

Finally, the issue of whether plaintiff's answers to the application for the concealed weapon were sufficient became moot as the result of the legislature amending that provision of law to include the objectionable questions in the City of Portland's ordinance.

In John Doe, et al. v Portland Housing Authority, 656 A. 2d 1200 (Me 1995), a number of tenants brought an action against the housing authority, which had banned possession of firearms, seeking to have the prohibition declared invalid. The authority prohibited the possession of firearms through a provision in its lease. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court first determined whether the Portland Housing Authority was a political subdivision of the state.

"The preemption statute is not clear on its face as to whether the PHA is a political subdivision. The term 'political subdivision' is not defined within the statute, and authorities are not named specifically as one of the enumerated examples of a political subdivision in the statute. See id 2011(2). It is significant that the statute makes it clear that the recited examples of political subdivisions are nonexclusive. Although the term political subdivision is defined in five other chapters, the different definitions do not lead to a consistent conclusion as to whether a municipal housing authority is a political subdivision.

"The principal thrust of the preemption statute voiced in the legislative record was to make the regulation of firearms uniform for all residents of Maine. Concern was expressed for laws in different communities imposing waiting periods on the purchase of firearms, different procedures for purchasing ammunition, and the resurrection of an old ordinance in Portland restricting the ability to carry a loaded firearm. Passed on the heels of a constitutional amendment changing Maine's constitutional right to bear arms from a collective to an individual right, section 2011 was enacted to reinforce the amendment and to ensure uniformity in the regulation of guns for all Maine citizens.

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"PHA's lease provision is contrary to the Legislature's intent to ensure that all Maine citizens are treated equally with regard to firearm regulation. Moreover, the governmental entities listed in the statute as political subdivisions are examples only, and nonexclusive. The PHA possesses broad powers consistent with its mission of carrying out 'public and essential functions,' and has many of the indicia of a governmental entity... All of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that the PHA, a 'public body corporate and politic,' is a political subdivision within the meaning of section 2011."

The Maine court concluded since the Housing Authority was a governmental unit, the provision in the lease was preempted by the statute. The Court also determined the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 1437 to 1437aaa-8(1994) did not preempt the state law as argued by the housing authority.

In Ex Parte Childers, 640 So. 2d 16 (Ala. 1994), the State of Alabama's firearms preemption law came into play in a criminal matter. Larry Douglas Childers was involved in a fight at a bar in Muscle Shoals. He shot the person he was fighting with and was convicted of manslaughter. At trial, Childers objected to the introduction of a Muscle Shoals city ordinance which indicated that a valid permit to carry the firearm is no defense to a charge of violating the ordinance. Childers had a valid permit from the state to carry a gun.

The lower court permitted the ordinance to be introduced into evidence because no particular state statute was cited to support the objection. The Alabama Court of Appeals refused to hear the issue on appeal because, in its opinion, the objection was not sufficient enough to apprise the trial court of a question of its constitutionality. The Appeals Court further indicated that the argument the ordinance was unconstitutional was without merit because a similar argument had been rejected in another case.

Childers appealed and the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the objection to the admission of the ordinance was sufficient because it questioned the legality of the Muscle Shoals ordinance. The Court further stated:

Moreover, had we concluded that the objection lacked the requisite specificity, we believe the general objection he made would have sufficed to preserve this issue for review, because the ordinance was illegal for any purpose and could not be made legal by supplying additional evidence.

The Alabama firearm preemption statute, Ala.Code 1975 11-45-1.1 reads as follows:

No incorporated municipality shall have the power to enact any ordinance, rule or regulation which shall tax, restrict, prevent, or in any way affect the possession or ownership of handguns by the citizens of this state. The entire subject matter of handguns is reserved to the State Legislature. This section shall not be construed to limit or restrict the power of a municipality to adopt ordinances which make the violation of a state handgun law a violation of a municipal ordinance to the same extent as other state law violations, or to limit or restrict the power of a municipal court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over violations of state handgun laws which may be prosecuted as breaches of a municipal ordinance.

In California, a number of cases have addressed the state's laws regarding the preemption of local firearm regulation. In Galvan v The Superior Court, 76 Cal Rptr. 642 (1969), John Galvan challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring the registration of all firearms within San Francisco. Galvan argued the ordinance was in direct conflict with state law, specifically Penal Code section 12026, and violated his constitutional right to bear arms as well as a number of other constitutional protections.

Penal Code section 12026 provides in relevant part:

(b) No permit or license to purchase, own, possess, keep or carry, either openly or concealed, shall be required of any citizen of the United States or legal resident over the age of 18 years who resides or is temporarily within this state, and who is not within the excepted class prescribed by [various statutes], to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry, either openly or concealed, a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person within the citizen's or legal resident's place of residence, place of business, or on private property lawfully owned or lawfully possessed by the citizens or legal resident.

The Court rejected Galvan's arguments stating that section 12026 prohibited licenses or permits, but not registration. The Court explained the difference between a license and registration:

"Any requirement that an item be registered before it can be lawfully used involves, of course, 'permission to do a particular thing,' and to that extent 'registration' is the same as 'licensing.' But the basic, and commonly held, distinction between licensing and registration is that licensing regulates activity based on a determination of the personal qualifications of the licensee, while registration catalogs all persons with respect to an activity, or all things that fall with certain classifications. Thus, voter registration lists merely enumerate all those persons who satisfy the requirements (are 'licensed') to vote.

The Court also rejected the argument that there was preemption by implication. After reviewing the three tests in California to determine whether preemption had occurred, the Court stated:

"Further, there are some indications that the Legislature did not believe that it had occupied the entire field of gun or weapons control. Thus, the Legislature has expressedly prohibited requiring a license to keep a concealable weapon at a residence or place of business. (Pen.Code, 12026.) Such a statutory provision would be unnecessary if the Legislature believed that all gun regulation was improper.

"The fact that there are numerous statutes dealing with guns or other weapons does not by itself show that the subject of gun or weapons control has been completely covered so as to make the matter one of exclusive state control."

Following the Court's decision in Galvan, the California Legislature amended state law to cover both registration and licensure. Originally Government Code section 9619, it was renumbered as 5-53071 in 1971 and now provides:

"It is the intention of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of regulation of the registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms as encompassed by the provisions of the Penal Code, and such provisions shall be exclusive of all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms, by any political subdivision as defined in Section 1721 of the Labor Code.

In Doe v City and County of San Francisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1982), the Court of Appeals struck down a San Francisco ordinance banning the possession of handguns within the county and city. Although the ordinance did exempt a number of persons from the ordinance, including police officers, persons using licensed target ranges, those authorized to carry concealed weapons, persons authorized to sell handguns, and others, the Court concluded the ordinance was in conflict with Penal Code section 12026 because it created a license requirement for one seeking to possess a handgun at home.

As discussed above, Penal Code section 12026 allows a person 18 and older to purchase, own and possess, keep or carry, either openly or concealed a pistol, revolver or other firearm within the person's home, place of business or upon property owned or lawfully possessed by the individual.

Though the City and County of San Francisco argued the statute did not prohibit them from regulating the possession of a firearm, the Court disagreed stating the ordinance's effect was "to create a new class of persons who will be required to obtain licenses in order to possess handguns." The Court further stated:

"The City and County of San Francisco argues that its ordinance merely acknowledges the supremacy of state law in the area of permits and licenses and exempts state-licensed persons from the local regulation. It is true that in form that is all the San Francisco Handgun Ordinance purports to do. However, it is also true that in substance it creates a licensing requirement where one had not previously existed. It violates the Legislature's statement of intention that the provisions of the Penal Code 'shall be exclusive of all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms...' (Italics added.) If not a direct licensing requirement, the San Francisco Handgun Ordinance is at least a local regulation relating to licensing." (Footnote ommitted.)

Finally, the Court concluded even if it had found no licensing requirement in the ordinance, it would still find preemption on the theory of implied preemption:

"It is at least arguable that the state Legislature=s adoption of numerous gun regulations has not impliedly preempted all areas of gun regulation. (see Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p 860.) However, we infer from Penal Code section 12026 that the Legislature intended to occupy the field of residential handgun possession to the exclusion of local governmental entities. A restriction on requiring permits and licenses necessarily implies that possession is lawful without a permit or license. It strains reason to suggest that the state Legislature would prohibit licenses and permits but allow a ban on possession."

In Suter v City of Lafayette, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (1997), the question concerned5-53071.5 of the California Code which reads:

" By the enforcement of this section, the Legislature occupies the whole field of regulation of the manufacture, sale, or possession of imitation firearms, as defined in Section 417.2 of the Penal Code, and that section shall preempt and be exclusive of all regulations relating to the manufacture, sale, or possession of imitation firearms, including regulations governing the manufacture, sale, or possession of BB guns and air rifles described in subdivision (g) of Section 12001 of the Penal Code."

The court found the California Legislature had preempted the entire field of regulation of imitation firearms, but also stated "[t]here is no comparable Legislative declaration of intent fully to occupy the whole field of regulation of the sale of non-imitation firearms...." (At 1124.) (emphasis added.)

Recently, the California Court of Appeals addressed an ordinance passed by the City of West Hollywood which banned the retail or wholesale sale of any handgun classified as a "Saturday Night Special" within the city limits. The California Rifle and Pistol Association sued to invalidate the ordinance arguing the ordinance was preempted by state law. The trial judge found the ordinance was not preempted and granted summary judgment for the city.

The California Court of Appeals in its decision filed September 29, 1998 determined the ordinance did not directly conflict with any state statute. California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v City of West Hollywood, 66 Cal. App.4th 1302 (1998)

Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides a city:

"may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws."

The Court of Appeals determined there was no preemption of the ordinance as the California Legislature had neither expressedly or impliededly preempted the area of local regulation of handgun sales. The Court noted that although the Legislature had the opportunity to express its intent to fully occupy the field of firearm regulation pursuant to the cases previously discussed, it had not done so in its responses to those cases. The Court further explained that no implied preemption had taken place because none of the three indicators (as identified in Sherwin-Williams v City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal.4th 893 (1993)) of such an intent revealed a legislative desire to preempt. The court explained its reasoning:

"Although it is clear that the Legislature could preempt all local ordinances regarding handgun sales, it is equally clear that the Legislature has not done so. Instead the Legislature has studiously avoided comprehensive preemption of such local laws, despite several legislative opportunities to enact a complete preemption. Since the Legislature has avoided preemption of all local regulation of handgun sales, the City continues to enjoy at least some of the constitutional right to regulate handgun sales. The ordinance in question here does not directly conflict with any state statute, and the question of whether to have such an ordinance is a decision within the authority of local elected legislators."

The California Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for review on December 22, 1998.

In Oregon State Shooting Association v Multnomah County, 122 Or App 540 (1993), the plaintiff=s sought a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of firearms ordinances passed in Multnomah County and the City of Portland.

In 1990 Multnomah County adopted an ordinance charging a $15.00 fee to cover the costs associated with conducting a criminal background check for those purchasing handguns. The City of Portland also adopted an ordinance charging $15.00 for the background check. Multnomah County also classified certain weapons as "assault weapons" and prohibited their possession and sale at the Exposition Center. The county ordinance also prohibited possession of an assault weapon in a public place unless it was transported in a specified manner. Finally, the county ordinance indicated the weapons listed were not protected by Article I, section 27 of the Oregon Constitution.

Referring to Delgado, supra, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated the weapons involved in the ordinance failed the test set out by the state's Supreme Court:

"Under the test, a weapon must satisfy three criteria: (1) although the weapon may subsequently have been modified, it must be "of the sort@" in existence in the mid-nineteenth century; (2) the weapon must have been in common use, and (3) it must have been used for personal defense"

Following the Court of Appeals review of the Oregon Supreme Court's analyses, they explained:

"We conclude that the resolution of whether a weapon is of the 'sort' known in the mid-nineteenth century involves more than parsing through the evolution of a particular weapon. Article I, section 27, protects the right to bear arms in defense of self and in defense of the state. The Supreme Court has recognized that, when the constitution was drafted, those arms were the same. Technology has now defined a difference between personal weapons for defense of self and weapons of warfare. The court has concluded that the determination of what weapons come within the constitutional provision encompasses consideration of whether the drafters would have intended the constitutional protection to apply if they had envisioned the technological advancements and the reasons for which those advancements were made.

"The dissent acknowledges that '[t]he listed firearms may look like military weapons or may have taken their design from military weapons' but finds that irrelevant because 'so too did the firearms possessed by militiamen and civilians in the mid-nineteenth century.' 122 Or App at 558. That statement ignores the Supreme Court's determination that there is a point at which weapons for self-defense and military purposes ceased to be the same and that advanced weapons of military warfare were never intended for personal possession and protection.

"The trial court cited plaintiff's exhibit of a study by the United States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that included many of the weapons at issue here.

That study noted the only real difference between the civilian and military weapons is that the civilian models supposedly are not capable of fully automatic fire. The trial court found that '[t]he record in this case establishes that virtually all of the Ordinance 646 weapons originated as or evolved from military ordinance.' Even plaintiff's expert conceded that the 'original intent of probably two-thirds of the weapons was in military application' and that the weapons are generally copies of military weapons and 'are slightly modified and presented in civilian mode.' The trial court concluded that the weapons 'can be converted readily back into the fully automatic military configuration.'

"The dissent is incorrect that our conclusion that the semi-automatic weapons are not constitutionally protected is based solely on technological developments. Even if the listed weapons could be said to be the 'equivalent' of mid-nineteenth century repeating firearms used for self-defense, such firearms were not in common use at the time. To meet that test, plaintiffs relied on the existence in the mid-1850's of a manually operated repeating rifle known as the Volcanic, some of which may have been in the Oregon Territory. However, the evidence showed that the Volcanic had trouble in detonating and was not commercially successful. That rifle was produced from 1855 to 1857, when the company went into receivership. From 1857 to 1860, the company produced about 3,200 firearms that retained the basic features of the earlier Volcanic rifles. The Henry repeating rifle was not introduced until 1860, after the 1859 approval of the Oregon Constitution.

"We hold that the weapons listed in Multnoham County Ordinance 646 are not 'arms' within the meaning of Article I, section 27." [Footnotes and cites omitted.]

The Court next considered whether that portion of the ordinance prohibiting any person from possessing an assault weapon in the Exposition Center for purpose of sale was in conflict with state law.

At the time, ORS 166.245 provided:

"Except as otherwise provided by law, cities, counties and other political subdivisions of this state may regulate only the possession of firearms and ammunition in a public place, as defined in ORS 161.015.@ (Emphasis added.) [ORS 166.245 has been replaced by ORS 166.170-166.176, see appendices]

The Court concluded the statute permitted local ordinances only as to the possession of firearms in public places, but the legislative history indicated such ordinances could not prohibit the sales of weapons because the state statute preempted local governments from imposing any restrictions in that regard.

Finally, the court upheld the fees imposed by Mulnomah County and the City of Portland, finding them to be compensatory in nature. The court further stated "[n]either imposes a sanction for failure to pay the fee nor prevents the sale from being made if the fee is not paid. The provisions do not regulate firearms and are not preempted by state law." The Oregon Supreme Court declined to hear petitioner's appeal of this matter.

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Although there is no case interpreting the state's firearms preemption statute, a number of cases in Michigan have addressed the issue of state preemption of local ordinances. Before discussing preemption statutes, it is important to note the difference between the concepts of "preemption" and "conflict" as they are sometimes closely related, particularly where there is no expression of an intent to preempt local ordinances. As stated in City of Detroit v Recorder's Court Traffic and Ordinance Judge, 104 Mich App 214 (1981):

"The preemption doctrine provides that a municipal ordinance may not invade a field completely occupied by state statute. Where the state has preempted the field, the ordinance is void, irrespective of whether the statute and the ordinance conflict. The conflict doctrine only invalidates ordinances actually in conflict with the state law where the entire area has not been preempted.." (Cites discussed below.)

In a criminal obscenity case, People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 (1977), the Michigan Supreme Court developed the analysis to be employed to determine whether a municipal ordinance is preempted by state law as follows:

"A municipality is precluded from enacting an ordinance * * * if the state statutory scheme pre-empts (sic) the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation.

"In making the determination that the state has thus pre-empted (sic) the field of regulation which the city seeks to enter in this case, we look to certain guidelines.

"First, where the state law expressly provides that the state's authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be exclusive, there is no doubt that municipal regulation is pre-empted. Noey v. Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935).

"Second, pre-emption of a field of regulation may be implied upon an examination of legislative history. Walsh v. River Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971).

"Third, the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme may support a finding of preemption (sic). (Citations omitted.) While the pervasiveness of the state regulator scheme is not generally sufficient by itself to infer pre-emption (sic), it is a factor which should be considered as evidence of pre-emption (sic).

"Fourth, the nature of the regulated subject matter may demand exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state's purpose or interest." (Footnotes omitted.)

In Llewellyn, supra, the Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held the City of East Detroit's antiobscenity ordinance was preempted by state law in effect at the time the case arose. MCL 750.343a et seq.

In Llewellyn, supra, the Court noted that "where the nature of the regulated subject matter calls for regulation adapted to local conditions, and the local regulation does not interfere with the state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has generally been upheld." The Court further stated:

However, where the Court has found that the nature of the subject matter regulated called for a uniform state regulatory scheme, supplementary local regulation has been pre-empted (sic)."

The Court discussed the cases of Walsh v River Rouge, 385 623 (1971), Noey v Saginaw, 271 Mich 595 (1935) and Grand Haven v Grocer's Cooperative Dairy Co, 330 Mich 694 (1951). In Walsh, supra, it was determined that a local ordinance giving emergency powers to the mayor was preempted because the ordinance involved potential restrictions of civil rights. In Noey, supra, and Grand Haven, supra, the state was found to have exclusive jurisdiction to control alcoholic beverage traffic and the pasteurization of milk, respectively. In both Noey and Grand Haven specific legislative language indicated an intention to preempt local regulation. In Llewellyn, supra, the Court conceded that they had "no express statutory language nor legislative history which indicates one way or the other whether the state statutory scheme preempts an ordinance such as the one before us.:" In the absence of specific preemptive language, the Court explained its reasoning for finding the ordinance invalid:

"However, the two other factors to be considered indicate that an ordinance such as the one before us has been preempted because the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme established by the state shows a pre-emptive (sic) intent, and because the nature of the regulated subject matter demands uniform, statewide treatment.

"As to the comprehensiveness issue, an examination of the state statutory scheme reveals a broad, detailed, and multifacted attack on the sale, distribution and exhibition of obscenity.

"The breadth and detail of this statutory scheme provides an indication that the Legislature has pre- empted (sic) the definition and deterrence of criminal obscenity, at least to the exclusion of a supplementary ordinance such as the one before us, which seeks to establish its own definition and test for obscenity, to modify the state standards for a prima facie case of the prohibited conduct, and to alter the state-prescribed punishment upon conviction."

The Court further noted that local obscenity ordinances could create confusion for distributors and would effectively chill first amendment rights because distributors would be subject to criminal prosecutions with little opportunity to discover the nature of the prohibited conduct. The Court stated such uncertainty would violate "a long-standing rule in this state that criminal offenses must establish with reasonable certainty the elements of the offense so that all persons subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid." Citing People v Goulding, 275 Mich 353 (1936).

In the opinion, the majority also noted that the legislative scheme did not indicate a legislative intent to preclude local zoning ordinances governing the location of adult entertainment establishments. That law at issue in this case was repealed by 1984 Public Act 343, effective March 29, 1985. The successor law is now found at MCL 752.368 et seq. In pertinent part, Section 10 of the new law states:

"(1) A municipality, township, village, city or an instrumentality thereof shall not enact or enforce any law, ordinance, or rule which regulates, or intends to regulate any matter covered by this act.

The Legislature specifically excluded the law's application to a zoning law, zoning ordinance, or zoning rule. There have been no cases interpreting the new language.

Of note in the case is the dissent by Justice Ryan (now a member of the United States 6th District Court of Appeals) in which he wrote:

"Essentially, the principle of preemption is that when general law on a specific subject occupies a particular field so completely that any local ordinances seeking to regulate conduct in that field will necessarily conflict because of inconsistency between the two, the ordinance must give way to the general law."

"Consequently, to justify the conclusion in this case that the state legislation has preempted the field of obscenity regulation, it must be clearly evident that the East Detroit ordinance is in direct conflict with the constitution or a state statute. Merely because the state has entered into the field of obscenity regulation is no justification for the implication that local regulation will necessarily conflict. When the Legislature prohibits certain conduct, local communities may nevertheless prohibit other and different conduct in the same field, providing the state and local enactments are not in conflict."

"This court has never inferred preemption merely because the state and local communities have legislated in the same field. On the contrary, in order to insure the reasonableness of such a finding and to properly safeguard the authority of local communities, this Court has always demonstrated an express showing of the Legislature's intent to exclusively occupy the field before invalidating an ordinance on preemptive grounds."

The issue of preemption brings into question the relationship of the state and local units of government. 1963, art 7, s 22 addresses the powers given to cities and villages in this state:

"Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. Each such city and village shall have power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section."(emphasis added).

Likewise, pursuant to MCL 46.11, a county board of commissioners is granted certain powers including:

(b) [b]y majority vote of the members of the county board of commissioners elected and serving, pass ordinances that relate to county affair and do not contravene the general laws of this state or interfere with the local affairs of a township, city or village, within the limits of the county..."

Historically, with the adoption of the home rule act, cities felt they had powers granted to them which were not previously available to them. However, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed this issue In Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 260-261, 175 N.W. 480 (1919):

"There is apparent a widely spread notion that lately, in some way, cities have become possessed of greatly enlarged powers, the right to exercise which may come from mere assertion of their existence and the purpose to exercise them. Whether these powers are really inherent in the community, but their exercise formerly was restrained, or are derived from a new grant of power by the State, or may be properly ascribed to both inherent right and to a new grant, are questions which do not seem to bother very much the advocates of the doctrine that they in any event exist. On the other hand, there is expression of grave doubt whether in the view of the law, there has been any enlargement or extension of the subjects of municipal legislation and control or of the powers of cities except as those subjects and powers are specifically enumerated and designated in the Constitution itself and in the home rule act."

An example of a state restriction on the power of a municipality is the case of Oppenhuizen v City of Zeeland, 101 Mich App 40 (1980), the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed whether a local ordinance - which prohibited the sale or giving away of intoxicating beverages in the City of Zeeland- a Home Rule city - was preempted by state law.

Const. 1963, art 4, ' 40 provides in pertinent part:

"(T)he legislature may by law establish a liquor control commission which, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic in this state, including the retail sales thereof. The legislature may provide for an exercise tax on such sales. Neither the legislature nor the commission may authorize the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages in any county in which a majority of the electors voting thereon shall prohibit the same." (italics added.)

Pursuant to the Constitutional provision, the legislature created the liquor control commission. MCL 436.1, et seq. In pertinent part, the Act provides:

"Except as by this act otherwise provided, the commission shall have the sole right, power and duty to control the alcoholic beverage traffic and traffic in other alcoholic liquor within the state of Michigan, including the manufacture, importation, possession, transportation and sale thereof." (emphasis added).

In Oppenhuizen, supra, the Court determined since the Legislature had established the Liquor Control Commission pursuant to the authority of the Constitution, the commission did have complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic in the state, subject to a majority of electors in a county voting to prohibit the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages. Since the electors of Ottawa County had not voted to prohibit the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages, the Liquor Control Commission had complete control and the city ordinance purporting to prohibit the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages was preempted.

However, where no preemptive intent is expressed, the Court has made it clear that local regulatory ordinances, if not in conflict with State law, are valid so far as preemption doctrine is concerned. County of Saginaw v John Sexton Corp, ___Mich App___ (1998 [landfill fees]; City of Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 (1990) [storage of fireworks]; Miller v Fabius Tp. Bd., St. Joseph County, 366 Mich 250 (1962) [local water skiing restrictions]; City of Howell v Kaal, 341 Mich 585 (1954) [zoning; trailer parks].

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Michigan Firearm Preemption

We now turn our attention to the language of the Michigan firearms preemption statute:

  (2) A local unit of government shall not impose special taxation on, enact or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols or other firearms, ammunition for pistols or other firearms, or components of pistols or other firearms, except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state.

(b) Prohibiting or regulating the transportation, carrying, or possession of pistols and other firearms by employees of that local unit of government in the course of their employment with that local unit of government.

(4) This act does not prohibit a city or a charter township from prohibiting the discharge of a pistol or other firearm within the jurisdiction of that city or charter township.

Despite the fact there is little legislative history regarding the passage of the statute, it is clear that the Legislature specifically intended to preempt local units of government from passing any ordinance regarding firearms, except for the exceptions as provided in the statute.

In ' 1102, the law prohibits the imposition of any tax and prohibits a local unit of government from enacting or enforcing any ordinance or regulation regarding ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols and other firearms. In light of a review of other ordinances from around the country, it appears the legislative intent was to occupy the entire field of firearms, except for those areas specifically provided in statute. For example, in California, the City of West Hollywood's prohibition of sales of so-called "Saturday Night Specials" has been upheld because the State of California has not preempted local units of government from controlling same. There is no mention in the California statute about the sale of firearms, but, rather, the legislature has preempted locals regarding the licensing and registration of commercially manufactured firearms only. Ironically, the State of California has occupied the entire field of imitation firearms.

One question which has arisen is whether a local unit of government could enact a so-called child access prevention (CAP) ordinance; something fifteen states have passed. Because such an ordinance touches upon the area of "possession" it is unlikely that a court would uphold such an ordinance unless the court could be convinced that the Legislature intended "possession" in the statute to be similar to the meaning in sports, i.e. the actual control of a basketball or hockey puck. Given the fact the Legislature used both "ownership" and "possession" in the statute, the idea the Legislature meant "possession" to be actual control of the gun is not out of the realm of possibility. If a court were to accept this definition, then a CAP ordinance passed for the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of a local unit of government could be upheld. When terms are undefined in a statute as they are here, the courts generally give them their common meaning.

However, in the case of People v Williams, 198 Mich App 532 (Aft Rem) (1993), a case involving the felony-firearm statute, the Court of Appeals determined that a person has "possession" even when a gun is inside a metal box padlocked within a wooden safe.

The Court of Appeals panel refused to follow People v Myers, 153 Mich App 124 (1986), wherein the court required actual possession at the time of an arrest.

Recently, the City of Lansing passed an ordinance which prohibits the possession of a gun or other weapons in city hall. The ordinance is, in all probability, in violation of the preemption law for a number of reasons, and illustrates the impact of the law. For example, while the statute does give the City of Lansing the ability to regulate the transportation, carrying, or possession of pistols and other firearms of its employees in the course of their employment, it preempts the city from imposing any regulation, in this instance, on the transportation or possession of pistols or other firearms as long as such transportation or possession is not a criminal offense under state law. Clearly, a person having a legally authorized permit to carry a concealed weapon which does not prohibit the carrying of same in a public building is protected by the preemption statute. Also, it is legal to openly carry a firearm without a permit outside of all clothing. Op Atty Gen 1945-46, No.0-3158, p237. Pursuant to the preemption statute, the city possesses no authority to interfere with the transportation or possession of such a weapon.

I believe '1102 falls within the first test enunciated in Llewellyn, supra, i.e. it expressedly provides to the state exclusive authority to regulate the field of firearms. Accordingly, local units of government are precluded from enacting an ordinance which attempts to control the transportation or possession of a firearm.

House Bill 6010, which was tied barred to the preemption bill, now found at M.C.L. 750.234d, supports the conclusion that the city cannot act in this area. Section 234d (1) prohibits the possession of a firearm, with exceptions not applicable here, at a depository financial institution, a church or other house of religious worship, a court, a theatre, a sports arena, a day care center, a hospital or an establishment licensed under the liquor control act. Subsection (2) (c) specifically states that the section does not apply to a person licensed by this state or another to carry a concealed weapon. Other than courts, no governmental locations were included in the amendment. Accordingly, given the fact that the state occupies the entire field of regulation in this area, a city ordinance purporting to ban the possession of firearms on its premises is invalid as it applied to persons who legally possess a firearm. As the court indicated in Llewellyn, supra, even where there is no direct conflict between an ordinance and the statute, the ordinance is invalid where the state occupies the field. It is clear from the protest remarks of a number of Senators who voted against the preemption bill that they felt the law was intended to preempt local units of government from enacting local ordinances. Under the law of preemption, the ordinances need not conflict with the state statute in order to be invalid. Accordingly, in assessing Michigan's firearms statute against the principles enunciated by the Michigan Supreme Court, similar statutes around the country and courts interpretation of same, it is unlikely that any local ordinance purporting to regulate firearms beyond what is contained in the statute would be upheld by the courts.

No incorporated municipality shall have the power to enact any ordinance, rule or regulation which shall tax, restrict, prevent, or in any way affect the possession or ownership of handguns by the citizens of this state. The entire subject matter of handguns is reserved to the State Legislature. This section shall not be construed to limit or restrict the power of a municipality to adopt ordinances which make the violation of a state handgun law a violation of a municipal ordinance to the same extent as other state law violations, or to limit or restrict the power of a municipal court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over violations of state handgun laws which may be prosecuted as breaches of a municipal ordinance.

(a) A municipality may not, except by ordinance ratified by the voters, restrict the right to own or possess firearms within a residence or transport unloaded firearms.

(b) This section applies to home rule and general law municipalities. ( 10 ch 74 SEA 1985)

Arizona: 13-3108

A. Ordinances of any political subdivision of this state relating to the transportation, possession, carrying, sale and use of firearms in this state shall not be in conflict with this chapter.

B. A political subdivision of this state shall not require the licensing or registration of firearms or prohibit the ownership, purchase, sale or transfer of firearms.

(a) As used in this section, Alocal unit of government@ means a city, town, or county.

(b) A local unit of government shall not enact any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner, the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of firearms, ammunition for firearms, or components of firearms, except as otherwise provided in state or federal law. This shall not prevent the enactment of an ordinance regulating or forbidding the unsafe discharge of a firearm.

[ (c) regarding a state of emergency has been intentionally excluded]

It is the intention of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of regulation of the registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms as encompassed by the provisions of the Penal Code, and such provisions shall be exclusive of all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms, by any political subdivision as defined in Section 1721 of the Labor Code.

(c) The county governments shall enact no law or regulation prohibiting, restricting or licensing the ownership, transfer, possession or transportation of firearms or components of firearms or ammunition except that the discharge of a firearm may be regulated; provided any law, ordinance or regulation incorporates the justification defenses as found in Title 11 of the Delaware Code.

(1) Preemption. - Except as expressly provided by general law, the Legislature hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition, including the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or regulations relating thereto. Any such existing ordinances are hereby declared null and void. This subsection shall not affect zoning ordinances which encompass firearms businesses along with other businesses. Zoning ordinances which are designed for the purpose of restricting or prohibiting the sale, purchase, transfer, or manufacture of firearms or ammunition as a method of regulating firearms or ammunition are in conflict with this subsection and are prohibited.

[Subsection 2 permits a county to have a waiting-period ordinance not exceeding 3 working days.]

(3) Policy and intent - (a) It is the intent of this section to provide uniform firearms laws in the state; to declare all ordinances and regulations null and void which have been enacted by any jurisdictions other than state and federal, which regulate firearms, ammunition, or components thereof; to prohibit the enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to firearms, ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically authorized by this section or general law; and to require local jurisdictions to enforce state firearms laws.

[Section (b) deals with the naming of the act.]

(a) It is declared by the General Assembly that the regulation of firearms is properly an issue of general, state-wide concern.

(b) No county or municipal corporation, by zoning or by ordinance, resolution, or other enactment shall regulate in any manner gun shows, the possession, ownership, transport, carrying, transfer, sale, purchase, licensing, or registration of firearms, components of firearms, firearms dealers, or dealers in firearm components.

(c) A county or municipal corporation may regulate the transport, carrying or possession of firearms by employees of the local unit of government in the course of employment with the local unit of government.

(d) Nothing contained in this Code section shall prohibit municipalities or counties, by ordinance, resolution, or other enactment, from reasonably limiting or prohibiting the discharge of firearms within the boundaries of the municipal corporation.

No board of county commissioners of any county may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession or transportation of firearms when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by the laws of the state of Idaho.

Notwithstanding IC 36-1-3, a unit may not regulate in any manner the ownership, possession, sale, transfer, or transportation of firearms (as defined in IC 35-47-1-5) or ammunition except as follows:

(1) This chapter does not apply to land buildings, or other real property owned or administered by a unit, except highways (as defined in IC 8-23-1-23) or public highways (as defined in IC 8-2.1-17-14).

(2) Notwithstanding the limitation in this section, a unit may use the unit=s planning and zoning powers under IC 36-7-4 to prohibit the sale of firearms within two hundred (200) feet of a school by a person having a business that did not sell firearms within two hundred (200) feet of a school before April 1, 1994.

(3) Notwithstanding the limitation of this section, a legislative body of a unit other than a township may adopt an emergency ordinance or a unit other than a township may take other action allowed under section 6 [IC 35-47-11-6] of this chapter to regulate the sale of firearms anywhere within the unit for a period of not more seventy-two (72) hours after the regulatory action takes place.

A political subdivision of the state shall not enact an ordinance regulating the ownership, possession, legal transfer, lawful transportation, registration, or licensing of firearms when the ownership, possession, transfer, or transportation is otherwise lawful under the laws of the state. An ordinance regulating firearms in violation of this section existing on or after April 5, 1990, is void.

No city, county or urban-county government may occupy any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession, carrying or transportation of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or combination thereof.

No governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact after July 15, 1985, any ordinance or regulation more restrictive than state law concerning in any way the sale, purchase, possession, ownership, transfer, transportation, license, or registration of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or ammunition; provided, however, that this Section shall not apply to the levy and collection of sales and use taxes, license fees and taxes and permit fees, nor shall it affect the authority of political subdivisions to prohibit the possession of a weapon or firearm in certain commercial establishments and public buildings.

1. Preemption. The State intends to occupy and preempt the entire field of legislation concerning the regulation of firearms, components, ammunition and supplies. Except as provided in subsection 3, any existing or future order, ordinance, rule or regulation in this field of any political subdivisions of the State is void.

2. Regulation restricted. Except as provided in subsection 3, no political subdivision of the State, including, but not limited to, municipalities, counties, townships and village corporations, may adopt any order, ordinance, rule or regulation concerning the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting, registration, taxation or any other matter pertaining to firearms, components, ammunition or supplies.

[ Subdivisions 3 and 4 deal with civil penalties and law enforcement agency regulations.]

(a) Handguns, rifles, shotguns, and ammunition. - Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the State of Maryland hereby preempts the rights of any county, municipal corporation, or special taxing district whether by law, ordinance, or regulation to regulate the purchase, sale, taxation, transfer, manufacture, repair, ownership, possession, and transportation of the following:

(1) Handgun, as defined in 36F (b) of this article;

(2) Rifle, as defined in 36F (d) of this article;

(3) Shotgun, as defined in 36F (g) of this article; and

(4) Ammunition and components for the above enumerated items.

(b) Exceptions - Any county, municipal corporation, or special taxing district may regulate the purchase, sale, transfer, ownership, possession, and transportation of the weapons and ammunition listed in subsection (a) of this section:

(1) With respect to minors;

(2) With respect to these activities on or within 100 yards of parks, churches, schools, public buildings, and other places of public assembly; however, the teaching of firearms safety training or other educational or sporting use may not be prohibited; and

(3) With respect to law enforcement personnel of the subdivision.

(c) Authority to amend local laws or regulations. - To the extent that local laws or regulations do not create an inconsistency with the provisions of this section or expand existing regulatory control, any county, municipal corporation, or special taxing district may exercise its existing authority to amend any local laws or regulations that exist before January 1, 1985.

(d) Discharge of handguns, rifles, and shotguns. - In accordance with law, any county, municipal corporation, or special taxing district may continue to regulate the discharge of handguns, rifles, and shotguns, but may not prohibit the discharge of firearms at established ranges.

Sections 624.711 to 624.716 shall be construed to supersede municipal or county regulation of the carrying or possessing of pistols and the regulation of Saturday Night Special Pistols.

Subject to the provisions of Section 45-9-53, no county or municipality may adopt any ordinance that restricts or requires the possession, transportation, sale, transfer or ownership of firearms or ammunition or their components.

[45-9-53 provides for specific exceptions, such as regulating the discharge of a firearm and the regulation of firearms during a riot.]

1. The general assembly hereby occupies and preempts the entire field of legislation touching in any way firearms, components, ammunition and supplies to the complete exclusion of any order, ordinance or regulation by any political subdivision of this state. Any existing or future orders, ordinances or regulations in this field are hereby and shall be null and void except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

2. No county, city, town, village, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state shall adopt any order, ordinance, or regulation concerning in any way the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permit, registration, taxation other than sales and compensating use taxes or other controls on firearms, components, ammunition, and supplies except as provided in subsection 3 of this section.

[Subsection 3 does permit regulation of open carrying of firearms, if such law is exactly like the state law.]

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), no county, city, town, consolidated local government, or other local government unit may prohibit, register, tax, license, or regulate the purchase, sale or other transfer (including delay in purchase, sale, or other transfer), ownership possession, transportation, use, or unconcealed carrying of any weapon, including a rifle, shotgun, handgun, or concealed handgun.

(2) (a) For public safety purposes, a city or town may regulate the discharge of rifles, shotguns, and handguns. A County, city, town, consolidated local government, or other local government unit has power to prevent and suppress the carrying of concealed or unconcealed weapons to a public assembly, publicly owned building, park under its jurisdiction, or school, and the possession of firearms by convicted felons, adjudicated mental incompetents, illegal aliens, and minors.

(b) Nothing contained herein shall allow any government to prohibit the legitimate display of firearms at shows or other public occasions by collectors and others, nor shall anything contained herein prohibit the legitimate transportation of firearms through any jurisdiction, whether in airports or otherwise.

Nebraska: 69-2425 [Nebraska has a comprehensive statute dealing with firearms found at 69-2401-2426.]

Section 2425 provides:

Any city or village ordinance existing on September 6, 1991, shall not be preempted by sections 69-2401 to 69-2425.

1. Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, the legislature reserves for itself such rights and powers as are necessary to regulate the transfer, sale, purchase, possession, ownership, transportation, registration and licensing of firearms and ammunition in Nevada, and no county may infringe upon those rights and powers.

2. A board of county commissioners may proscribe by ordinance or regulation the unsafe discharge of firearms.

3. As used in this section, Afirearm@ means any weapon from which a projectile is discharged by means of an explosive, spring, gas, air or other force.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the local governmental units of this State may neither enact nor enforce any ordinance or other local law or regulation conflicting with, or preempted by, any provision of this code or with any policy of this State expressed by this code, whether that policy be expressed by inclusion of a provision in the code, or by exclusion of that subject from the code.

(a) It is declared by the General Assembly that the regulation of firearms is properly an issue of general, statewide concern, and that the entire field of regulation of firearms is preempted from regulation by local governments except as provided by this section.

(b) Unless otherwise permitted by statute, no county or municipality, by ordinance, resolution, or other enactment, shall regulate in any manner the possession, ownership, storage, transfer, sale, purchase, licensing, or registration, of firearms, firearms ammunition, components of firearms, dealers in firearms, or dealers in handgun components or parts.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, a county or municipality, by zoning or other ordinance, may regulate or prohibit the sale of firearms at a location only if there is a lawful, general, similar regulation or prohibition of commercial activities at that location. Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the right of a county or municipality to adopt a general zoning plan that prohibits any commercial activity within a fixed distance of a school or other educational institution except with a special use permit issued for a commercial activity found not to pose a danger to the health, safety, or general welfare of persons attending the school or educational institution within the fixed distance.

(d) No county or municipality, by zoning or other ordinance, shall regulate in any manner firearms shows with regulations more stringent than those applying to shows of other types of items.

(e) A county or municipality may regulate the transport, carrying, or possession of firearms by employees of the local unit of government in the course of their employment with that local unit of government.

(f) Nothing contained in this section prohibits municipalities or counties from application of their authority under G.S. 153A-129, 160A-189, 14-269, 14-269.2, 14-269.3, 14-269.4, 14-277.2, 14-415.11, 14-415.23, including prohibiting the possession of firearms in public owned buildings, on the grounds or parking areas of those buildings, or in public parks or recreation areas, except nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a person from storing a firearm within a motor vehicle while the vehicle is on these grounds or areas. Nothing contained in this section prohibits municipalities or counties from exercising powers provided by law in declared states of emergency under Article 36A of this Chapter.

No political subdivision, including home rule cities or counties, may enact any ordinance relating to the purchase, sale, ownership, transfer of ownership, registration or licensure of firearms and ammunition which is more restrictive than state law. All such existing ordinances are void.

A. The State Legislature hereby occupies and preempts the entire field of legislation in this state touching in any way firearms, components, ammunition, and supplies to the complete exclusion of any order, ordinance, or regulation by any municipality or other political subdivision of this state. Any existing or future orders, ordinances, or regulations in this field, except as provided for in subsection C of this section are null and void. Provided, however, a municipality may adopt any ordinance relating to the discharge of firearms within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

B. No municipality or other political subdivision of this state shall adopt any order, ordinance, or regulation concerning in any way the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, carrying, bearing, transportation, licensing, permit, registration, taxation other than sales and compensating use taxes, or other controls on firearms, components, ammunition, and supplies.

C. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit any order, ordinance, or regulation by any municipality concerning the confiscation of property used in violation of the ordinances of the municipality as provided for in Section 28-121 of Title 11 of the Oklahoma Statutes.

(1) Except as express authorized by state statute, the authority to regulate in any manner whatsoever the sale, acquisition, transfer, ownership, possession, storage, transportation or use of firearms or any element relating to firearms and components thereof, including ammunition is vested solely in the Legislative Assembly.

(2) Except as express authorized by state statute, no county, city or other municipal corporation or district may enact civil or criminal ordinances, including but not limited to zoning ordinances, to regulate, restrict or prohibit the sale, acquisition, transfer, ownership, possession, storage, transportation or use of firearms or any element relating to firearms and components thereof, including ammunition. Ordinances that are contrary to this subsection are void.

Pennsylvania: 18 Pa.C.S.A. 6120

(a) General rule. - No county, municipality or township may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of firearms, ammunition or ammunition components when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth.

(b) Definition. - For the purpose of this section, the term Afirearms@ has the meaning given in section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of paramilitary training) but shall not include Aair rifles@ as defined in section 6304 (relating to sale and use of air rifles).

The control of firearms, ammunition, or their component parts regarding their ownership, possession, transportation, carrying, transfer, sale, purchase, purchase delay, licensing, registration, and taxation shall rest solely with the state, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

No governing body of any county, municipality, or other political subdivision in this State may enact or promulgate any regulation or ordinance which regulates or attempts to regulate the transfer, ownership, possession, carrying, or transportation of firearms, ammunition, components of firearms, or any combination of these things.

No county may pass any ordinance that restricts possession, transportation, sale, transfer, ownership, manufacture or repair of firearms or ammunition or their components. Any ordinances prohibited by this section are null and void.

No city, county, or urban-county government shall occupy any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession or transportation of firearms, ammunition or components of firearms or combination thereof; provided, that the provisions of this section shall be prospective only and shall not affect the validity of any ordinance or resolution lawfully enacted before April 8, 1986.

(a) A municipality may not adopt regulations relating to the transfer, private ownership, keeping, transportation, licensing, or registration of firearms, ammunition, or firearm supplies.

(b) Subsection (a) does not affect the authority a municipality has under another law to:

(1) require residents or public employees to be armed for personal or national defense, law enforcement, or other lawful purpose;

(2) regulate the discharge of firearms within the limits of the municipality;

(3) regulate the use of property, the location of a business, or uses at a business under the municipality=s fire code, zoning ordinance, or land-use regulations as long as the code, ordinance, or regulations are not used to circumvent the intent of Subsection (a) or Subdivision (5) of this subsection;

(4) regulate the use of firearms in the case of an insurrection, riot, or natural disaster if the municipality finds the regulations necessary to protect public health and safety;

(5) regulate the storage or transportation of explosives to protect public health and safety, except that 25 pounds or less of black powder for each private residence and 50 pounds or less of black powder for each retail dealer are not subject to regulation; or

(6) regulate the carrying of a firearm at a:

(A) public park;

(B) public meeting of a municipality, county, or other governmental body;

(C) political rally, parade, or official political meeting; or

(D) nonfirearms-related school, college, or professional athletic event.

(c) The exception provided by Subsection (b)(6) does not apply if the firearm is in or is carried to or from an area designated for use in a lawful hunting, fishing, or other sporting event and the firearm is of the type commonly used in the activity.

(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws throughout the state. Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be:

(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, transporting, or keeping any firearm at his place of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle under his control; or

(ii) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm.

(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to the state except where the Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms.

(2) [This section is the definition section.]

For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, welfare and convenience, a town, city or incorporated village shall have the following powers:

(8) To regulate or prohibit the use or discharge, but not possession of, firearms within the municipality or specified portions thereof.

Except as otherwise provided by law, no town, city or incorporated village, by ordinance, resolution or other enactment, shall directly regulate hunting, fishing and trapping or the possession, ownership, transportation, transfer, sale, purchase, carrying, licensing or registration of traps, firearms, ammunition or components of firearms or

ammunition. This section shall not limit the powers conferred upon a town, city or incorporated village under section 2291(8) of this title. The provisions of this section shall supersede any inconsistent provisions of a municipal charter.

From and after January 1, 1987, no locality shall adopt any ordinance to govern the purchase, possession, transfer, ownership, carrying or transporting of firearms, ammunition, or components or combination thereof other than those express authorized by statute.

Nothing in this section shall affect the validity or invalidity of any ordinance adopted prior to January 1, 1987. Nothing in this section shall have any effect on any pending litigation. However, no person may be prosecuted or convicted of any violation of any ordinance regulating the transportation of a firearm if he is (i) in lawful possession of the firearm and he has a valid concealed handgun permit issued pursuant to 18.2-308 or (ii) otherwise transporting the firearm in a lawful manner.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to enter the following places when he or she knowingly possesses or knowingly has under his or her control a weapon:

(a) The restricted access areas of a jail, or of a law enforcement facility, or any place used for the confinement of a person (i) arrested or, charged with, or convicted of an offense, (ii) held for extradition or as a material witness, or (iii) otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court, except an order under chapter 13.32A or 13.34 RCW. Restricted access areas do not include common areas of egress or ingress open to the general public;

(b) Those areas in any building which are used in connection with court proceedings, including courtrooms, jury rooms, judge=s chambers, offices and areas used to conduct court business, waiting areas, and corridors adjacent to areas used in connection with court proceedings. The restricted areas do not include common areas of ingress and egress to the building that is used in connection with court proceedings, when it is impossible to protect court areas without restricting ingress and egress to the building. The restricted areas shall be the minimum necessary to fulfill the objective of this subsection (1)(b).

In addition, the local legislative authority shall provide either a stationary locked box sufficient in size for pistols and key to a weapon owner for weapon storage, or shall designate an official to receive weapons for safekeeping, during the owner=s visit to restricted areas of the building. The locked box or designated official shall be located within the same building used in connection with court proceedings. The local legislative authority shall be liable for any negligence causing damage to or loss of a weapon either placed in a locked (sic) box or left with an official during the owner=s visit to restricted areas of the building.

The local judicial authority shall designate and clearly mark those areas where weapons are prohibited, and shall post notices at each entrance to the building of the prohibition against weapons in the restricted areas;

(c) The restricted access areas of a public mental health facility certified by the department of social and health services for inpatient hospital care and state institutions for the care of the mentally ill, excluding those facilities solely for evaluation and treatment. Restricted access areas do not include common areas of egress and ingress open to the general public; or

(d) That portion of an establishment classified by the state liquor control board as off-limits to persons under twenty -one years of age.

(2) Cities, towns, counties, and other municipalities may enact laws and ordinances:

(a) Restricting the discharge of firearms in any portion of their respective jurisdictions where there is a reasonable likelihood that humans, domestic animals, or property will be jeopardized. Such laws and ordinances shall not abridge the right of the individual guaranteed by Article I, section 24 of the state Constitution to bear arms in defense of self or others; and

(b) Restricting the possession of firearms in any stadium or convention center, operated by a city, town, county, or other municipality, except that such restrictions shall not apply ro:

(i) Any pistol in the possession of a person licensed under RCW 9.41.070 or exempt from the licensing requirement by RCW 9.41.060; or

(ii) Any showing, demonstration or lecture involving the exhibition of firearms.

(3)(a) Cities, towns, and counties may enact ordinances restricting the areas in their respective jurisdictions in which firearms may be sold, but, except as provided in (b) of this subsection, a business selling firearms may not be treated more restrictively than other businesses located within the same zone. An ordinance requiring the cessation of business within a zone shall not have a shorter grandfather period for businesses selling firearms than for any other businesses within the zone.

(b) Cities, towns, and counties, may restrict the location of a business selling firearms to not less than five hundred feet from primary or secondary school grounds, if the business has a storefront, has hours during which it is open for business, and posts advertisements or signs observable to passerby that firearms are available for sale. A business selling firearms that exists as of the date a restriction is enacted under this subsection (3) (b) shall be grandfathered according to existing laws.

(4) Violations of local ordinances adopted under subsection (2) of this section must have the same penalty as provided for by state law.

(5) The perimeter of the premises of any specific location covered by subsection (1) of this section shall be posted at reasonable intervals to alert the public as to the existence of any law restricting the possession of firearms on the premises.

(6) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to:

(a) A person engaged in military activities sponsored by the federal or state governments, while engaged in official duties;

(b) Law enforcement personnel; or

(c) Security personnel while engaged in official duties.

(7) Subsection (1) (a) of this section does not apply to a person licensed pursuant to RCW 9.41.070 who, upon entering the place or facility, directly and promptly proceeds to the administrator of the facility or the administrator=s designee and obtains written permission to possess the firearm while on the premises or checks his or her firearm. The person may reclaim the firearms upon leaving but must immediately and directly depart from the place or facility.

(8) Subsection (1) (c) of this section does not apply to any administrator or employee of the facility or to any person who, upon entering the place or facility, directly and promptly proceeds to the administrator of the facility or the administrator=s designee and obtains written permission to possess the firearm while on the premises.

(9) Subsection (1) (d) of this section does not apply to the proprietor of the premises or his or her employees while engaged in their employment.

(10) Any person violating subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(11) AWeapon@ as used in this section means any firearm, explosive as defined in RCW 70.74.010, or instrument or weapon listed in RCW 9.41.250.

The provisions of section five [ 8-12-5] of this article notwithstanding, neither a municipality nor the governing body of any municipality shall have the power to limit the right of any person to own any revolver, pistol, rifle or shotgun or any ammunition or ammunition components to be used therewith nor to so regulate the keeping of gunpowder so as to directly or indirectly prohibit the ownership of such ammunition. Nothing herein shall in any way impair the authority of any municipality, or the governing body, thereof, to enact any ordinance or resolution respecting the power to arrest, convict and punish any individual under the provisions of subdivision (16), section five [ 8-12-5(16) of this article or from enforcing any such ordinance or resolution.

(1) In this section:

(a) AFirearm@ has the meaning given in s. 167.31(1)(c).

(b) APolitical subdivision@ means a city, village, town or county.

(c) ASport shooting range@ means an area designed and operated for the practice of weapons used in hunting, skeet shooting and similar sport shooting.

(2) Except as provided in subs. (3) and (4), no political subdivision may enact an ordinance or adopt a resolution that regulates the sale, purchase, purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting, registration or taxation of any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader components, unless the ordinance or resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than, a state statute.

(3)(a) Nothing in this section prohibits a county from imposing a sales tax or use tax under subch. V of ch. 77 on any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader components, sold in the county.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits a city, village or town that is authorized to exercise village powers under s. 60.22(3) from enacting an ordinance or adopting a resolution that restricts the discharge of a firearm.

(4)(a) Nothing in this sections prohibits a political subdivision from continuing to enforce an ordinance or resolution that is in effect on November 18, 1995, and that regulates the sale, purchase, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting, registration or taxation of any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader components, if the ordinance or solution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than, a state statute.

(am) Nothing in this section prohibits a political subdivision from continuing to enforce until November 30, 1998, an ordinance or resolution that is in effect on November 18, 1995, and that requires a waiting period of not more than 7 days for the purchase of a handgun.

(b) If a political subdivision has in effect on November 17, 1995, an ordinance or resolution that regulates the sale, purchase, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession, bearing, transportation, licensing, permitting, registration or taxation of any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader components, and the ordinance or resolution is not the same as or similar to a state statute, the ordinance or resolution shall have no legal effect and the political subdivision may not enforce the ordinance or resolution on or after November 18, 1995.

(c) Nothing in this section prohibits a political subdivision from enacting and enforcing a zoning ordinance that regulates the new construction of a sport shooting range or when the expansion of an existing sport shooting range would impact public health and safety.

(5) A county ordinance that is enacted or a county resolution that is adopted by a county under sub. (2) or a county ordinance or resolution that remains in effect under sub. (4)(a) or (am) applies only in those towns in the county that have not enacted an ordinance or adopted a resolution under sub. (2) or that continue to enforce an ordinance or resolution under sub. (4)(a) or (am), except that this subsection does not apply to a sales or use tax that is imposed under subch. V of ch. 77.

(a) The sale, transfer, purchase, delivery, taxation, manufacture, ownership, transportation, storage, use and possession of firearms, weapons and ammunition shall be authorized, regulated and prohibited by the state, and regulation thereof is preempted by the state. Except as authorized by W.S. 15-1-103(a)(xviii), no city, town or county shall authorize, regulate or prohibit the sale, transfer, purchase, delivery, taxation, manufacture, ownership, transportation, storage, use or possession of firearms, weapons and ammunition except as