Law Enforcement

Keeping Guns Out of the Hands of Minors and Persons Dangerous to Themselves and Others

And
Enforcing Current Law

In response to increased rates of violent crime in the 1980s and into the middle of the 1990s, public officials at all levels of government began to take a more aggressive and a more proactive approach toward crime.  In more recent years, federal, state, and local law enforcement have continued to shift their focus and resources from reactive measures to proactive ones. Newly formed law enforcement strategies to prevent gun violence follow this model.  Additionally, when addressing a law enforcement problem with national and interstate dimensions, law enforcement approaches of necessity involve cooperative interaction between federal, state, and local police agencies, prosecutors, and the courts.

 Although the MPPGV focuses its attention on strategies aimed specifically at reducing firearm violence, it is important to note that many law enforcement strategies designed to impact crime more generally may affect the problem of gun crime.  For example, strategies that include increased police presence in high crime areas, achieved by both a sheer increase in the number of officers on the street and/or by community policing initiatives, is thought to be a visible deterrent to violent crime which includes firearm crime.  Similarly, a general crackdown on traffic offenses and minor so-called "quality of life" offenses such as loitering, drinking in public, or jumping a subway turnstile may impact gun crime to the extent that it lessens criminal activity on whole.  Implementation of this type of strategy not only makes for a more livable and safe environment, but also casts a wider net that may deter or assist in the identification of potentially more serious offenders.

 As important and as productive as such general crime deterrent strategies may be, strategies that are specific to gun violence prevention are critical to the lessening of the deadly potential of crime, to the extent that a crime victim is more likely to survive an incident that does not include a gun in the hands of the perpetrator.  Gun violence prevention specific law enforcement strategies include the major strategic initiatives outlined below.

Enforcing Current Law

The gun lobby has long argued that the answer to the problem of gun violence is not more laws, but better enforcement.  During the Clinton administration, federal firearms offense prosecutions increased by 16%, and state and local prosecutions increased by 22%.¹⁷  Additionally, sentences for violent gun criminals are two years longer than they have been under past administrations.  The laws are being enforced, and the courts are doing their part to bring habitual violent offenders to justice.¹⁷ 

 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act

During a recent debate at the National Press Club, NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre said that criminals rarely acquire guns from gun dealers. Mr. LaPierre should have prefaced his remark by saying, "because of the Brady background check.”¹

 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady) took effect in 1994. Prior to Brady, federally licensed firearm dealers relied upon the "honor system" to determine whether a potential buyer was legally prohibited from possessing firearms. The Brady Act gave teeth to the Gun Control Act of 1968 by requiring that all potential purchasers submit to background checks.   The evidence of the success of the Brady Act is fairly straightforward: as reported by the United States Department of Justice: 689,000 applications for purchases were rejected between 1994 and 2000.²  While this figure is compelling, it does not account for the large number of individuals who may choose to steer clear of licensed dealers altogether because of the required background check.

 While the primary means by which Brady works to keep firearms out of the hands of prohibited persons is by making it increasingly difficult and risky for a prohibited person to attempt to purchase a firearm firsthand from a licensed dealer, Brady has also had a significant effect on the secondary market.  The evidence for this is found in the data about the flow of guns in illegal markets in the United States.  In the illegal market, guns have traditionally flowed from states with lax gun laws to states with stricter gun laws. Prior to Brady, states that did not require background checks were a major source of guns for traffickers. The disparity in the laws from state to state made interstate trafficking in firearms quite profitable, as traffickers were able to purchase large numbers of guns at retail in states with lax purchase laws and them resell privately in areas where they would command a higher price. Brady not only makes it increasingly difficult for felons to engage in trafficking because of the background check, it essentially evens the legal playing field by reducing the disparity between states with strong gun laws and those with weak gun laws. Recent research bears this point out. By analyzing law enforcement crime firearm trace data, researchers from the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence found a lower percentage of crime guns in states with strong gun laws were traced back to those states with weak gun laws than had been the case before the law took effect.¹  This finding suggests that because of Brady, fewer guns are taken across state lines.

 Although the Brady Act has come under fire with the publication of a study suggesting that there is no evidence that it is associated with a reduction in homicide rates, the authors of that study acknowledge that they cannot account for the potential effects of Brady's disruption of interstate trafficking.³  The same study found that Brady did have an effect in the reduction of firearm suicide rates for individuals aged 55 years and older.    Presumably, the time needed for the background check allowed the suicidal individual an opportunity to reconsider his/her decision.  Another study suggests that Brady may have had a more direct effect on gun violence by reducing the proportion of robberies and assaults that are committed with firearms.⁴  This study suggests that due to the described decline in firearm robberies and assaults, over 9,000 deaths have been averted. While the studies mentioned above focus on the more general problem of gun violence, another recent study found that Brady might have a positive effect on the very individuals that it targets. This 1999 study found that a denying a handgun purchase to a convicted felon was associated with a reduction of risk for later criminal activity of 20% to 30%.⁵ 

Misdemeanor Prohibitions

Federal law prohibits felons, fugitives, individuals adjudicated as mentally ill, drug addicts, and other dangerous classes of individuals from purchasing and possessing firearms.  With such legislation in place, the perception is that only law-abiding citizens are permitted to own firearms.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Although federal law prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from purchasing and possessing firearms, there is nothing in the law that bars persons convicted of violent misdemeanors, such as simple assault, from buying and owning guns.  Researcher Garen Wintemute found that misdemeanants may be at increased risk for firearm related criminal activity, and that denying violent misdemeanants purchase of handguns results in decreased risk of later arrest for gun crime and/or crimes of violence.⁶  Wintemute found that handgun purchasers who had at least one prior misdemeanor conviction were more than 7 times as likely as purchasers with no criminal history to be charged with a new offense.  Of those purchasers with prior misdemeanor convictions, 13% were charged with nonviolent firearms offenses, 25% were charged with violent firearms offenses, and 15% were charged with violent crime “index” offenses such as murder or non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.  Since 1991, California has barred violent misdemeanants from purchasing handguns.  Wintemute evaluated the effectiveness of this policy in a 2001 study in which the post-purchase criminal histories of violent misdemeanants who were permitted purchase handguns before the law went into effect were compared to the post-denial criminal histories of violent misdemeanants who were denied purchase due to the new law.⁷  His study found that violent misdemeanants who were allowed to purchase handguns before this policy took effect were 29% more likely to be arrested for a new gun and/or violent crime than violent misdemeanants who were denied purchase pursuant to the new law.  Within specific age groups, the relative risk of new arrest was even greater: 21 to 24 year old purchasers were 37% more likely to pick up new charges than denied purchasers of the same age. 

 This research suggests that misdemeanor prohibitions may be necessary and effective tools in the greater effort to keep guns out of the wrong hands.  Although an extension of the prohibition for domestic violence misdemeanants in federal law might prove to be the most effective way to move this policy forward, state legislation is also possible.  However, any effective misdemeanor prohibition law is contingent upon the availability of comprehensive and accessible criminal records, an area in which much work remains to be done.    

 Closing The Gun Show Loophole

 The “Gun Show Loophole” is an anomaly in federal law that allows unlicensed gun sellers to sell firearms at gun shows without conducting background checks.  Under federal law, Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), who are known as “licensed dealers” are required to conduct background checks on all firearms that they sell, save for those which make up their “personal collection.”  Individuals who do not meet the technical statutory definition of being “engaged in the business” of firearms sales are free to sell firearms without conducting background checks at all, regardless of whether such sales take place at an organized gun show or in another setting.  Gun shows are of particular concern because they are perhaps the most visible and organized sector of the secondary market for guns in the United States.  ATF reports that more than 4,000 gun shows take place annually,⁸ at which between 100,000 and 300,000 firearms are sold.⁹  ATF estimates that FFLs typically make up between 50% and 75% of vendors at guns shows⁸, meaning that a significant percentage of gun show vendors can sell firearms “no questions asked.”  Because they offer criminals a wide variety of firearms at market prices with no background check required, ATF has characterized the gun show as “a forum for illegal firearms sales and trafficking.”⁸  Examination of ATF crime gun trace data suggests that states that have not closed the gun show loophole are flooding the nation with crime guns.  A 2001 study by Americans For Gun Safety found that of the 10 states that are the source of the most out-of-state crime guns, 9 had not closed the gun show loophole.⁹    Additionally, the Americans For Gun Safety study found that in states that have not closed the gun show loophole, criminals tend to acquire guns from in-state sources at a significantly higher rate than do criminals in states that have closed the gun show loophole.  This suggests that states that have not closed the gun show loophole make gun acquisition much easier for criminals. 

 Gun shows have been identified as a significant source of crime guns.  A review of ATF gun trafficking investigations found that between 1996 and 1998, gun shows were the second leading source of guns recovered in trafficking investigations, accounting for close to 26,000 illegally trafficked firearms.¹⁰  In a recent ATF investigation in Arizona, federal agents seized more than 1,500 firearms that were illegally sold at guns shows over a 15- month period.¹¹ 

 Advocates of closing the gun show loophole maintain that requiring background checks on all firearms transactions that occur at gun shows could reduce illegal gun sales while at the same time leaving law abiding gun owners and firearms enthusiasts free from undue inconvenience.  Several states have already closed the gun show loophole, but these policies can have only limited effect without federal legislation to close the gun show loophole.

 Coordinating and Cooperating

Increasingly, local law enforcement has formed partnerships with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), often cutting across jurisdictional boundaries, for the purpose of dealing with gun crime. In an effort to become better equipped to deal with gun crime, local police have received both training and ongoing support from ATF. In cities such as Baltimore and Chicago, police departments have created special divisions that are specifically dedicated to firearm investigations and seizures.  In Baltimore, for example, the gun squad has been able to target "straw purchasing" operations (whereby a person legally entitled to purchase firearms buys them with the intention of reselling them to prohibited persons) by building a rapport with dealers and training dealers to recognize straw purchasers, such that dealers can provide tips in cases where they suspect a straw purchaser is at work.

Directed Patrols

Additionally, technological advances in data collection have enabled law enforcement to coordinate geographical crime data in order to identify gun crime "hotspots" and allocate resources appropriately. Accordingly, police have been able to target specific neighborhoods where gun crime is particularly prevalent. By using this data to organize "directed patrols" of a hotspot area, police have been able to affect a dramatic decrease in gun violence. In Kansas City, Missouri, when police targeted an 80-block hotspot area over a 29-week period in 1992 and 1993 they saw a decline in gun crime of 49% and a decline in homicide of 67%.¹²

Ballistic Fingerprinting

Ballistics imaging is an area where advances in technology and partnerships between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies converge.  In a process known as “ballistic fingerprinting” guns can be traced by the unique markings that they leave on a bullet and shell casing when they are fired.  ATF and FBI maintain databases of ballistic images in order to assist crime laboratories across the country to link gun-related crimes.  Maryland and New York have recognized the investigative potential of this technology, and passed laws requiring that all new handguns be test-fired and have their ballistic fingerprints recorded in a database before they are sold.  As more states follow suit, and linkage between databases increases, the potential of this strategy increases.

Crime Gun Tracing Initiatives

As law enforcement agencies have focused on the problem of gun violence, they have examined both existing and emerging patterns in gun crime. One of the primary means of examining such patterns is by the coordination and expansion of tracing initiatives. Through cooperative efforts between federal, state, and local law enforcement, gun traces take less time and yield more accurate and comprehensive information than has been possible before such coordination. Due to this increased efficiency and accuracy, tracing is more effective as both an investigative tool in specific incidents and as a means to identifying long term patterns in gun trafficking and use. In 36 jurisdictions nationwide, law enforcement has made a commitment to trace every crime gun recovered, regardless of whether trace information is material to the case in which the gun was recovered. While such efforts may reveal information that bears on other criminal cases, they also serve to facilitate development of specific strategies to disrupt illegal gun markets in that area. Coupled with routine questioning and debriefing of offenders regarding the sources of their guns, tracing enables law enforcement to work towards stemming the tide of illegal guns onto the street.

Policing Dealers

The central strategy of a proactive approach to the problem of gun violence must be the disruption of illegal markets. Unlike illegal drugs or other contraband, nearly all crime guns start off as legal firearms. At some point, these guns are diverted into the illegal market, and made available to criminals and juveniles. Up until recent years, it was widely believed that most criminals acquired their guns by stealing them.  However, recent research suggests that only a small percentage of crime guns are diverted from the legal market by theft.^10,13,14,15  Instead, the majority of guns get into the illegal market by way of "straw purchasers," unlicensed sellers, corrupt Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs), and gun shows.  A recent review of ATF trafficking investigations found that while corrupt FFLs are involved in less than 10% of ATF trafficking investigations, they account for high numbers of trafficked of firearms.¹⁰  Of over 80,000 illegally trafficked firearms involved in the ATF investigations that were reviewed, over 40,000 were associated with corrupt FFLs.  Additionally, the review found that the average number of firearms involved in cases that implicated corrupt FFLs to be over 350, more than twice the next highest average number of firearms per investigation.  It is also clear that the majority of FFLs operate within the law, and that only a small minority of corrupt dealers are responsible for the lion’s share of illegal guns.  A 2000 ATF Report found that just over 1% of FFLs accounted for over 57 percent of crime guns traced back to current dealers in 1998.¹⁶ 

 Several cities have undertaken initiatives to police FFLs, with encouraging results. In New York, Oakland, California; Boston, and Baltimore, local police have joined forces with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to crack down on irresponsible and corrupt dealers.  In Oakland, where local ordinances require that gun dealers obtain permits from the police, thorough background checks are employed for new applications and renewals in order to screen out suspect applicants. Working in concert with municipal ordinances governing firearm sales, this initiative reduced the number of FFLs in Oakland from 57 to 6 over the two-year period from 1994 to 1996.¹²  In New York, law enforcement employed a similar strategy as part of a more comprehensive approach. As a result, more than 92% of applications for new licenses and renewals have been denied and more than 200 gun dealers have been arrested and had their weapons confiscated since the program’s inception in 1994.¹²  As a result of this program, the number of FFLs in New York City decreased by 73% between 1991 and 1996.¹²  Aside from cracking down on licensed dealers, these strategies discourage unqualified and suspect candidates from applying for licenses. Although these initiatives are bolstered by restrictive local ordinances specifically governing firearm sales, cities without such local ordinances may well get results by employing these strategies. One of the most common ways that law enforcement has done this is by conducting random compliance inspections. In Boston, these inspections resulted in 80% of all FFLs choosing either to surrender their licenses or not to renew them.¹²  The 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill provides that if a person holding an FFL is found to have violated any local laws, that license cannot be renewed. In Baltimore, where the problem of gun violence has been well documented, law enforcement used this provision to target dealers operating out of their homes in violation of basic zoning laws prohibiting the operation of any business out of the home. As a result, the number of FFLs there has decreased from over 400 to approximately 75 between 1995 and 1998.¹²  Certainly not all of the decrease in gun dealers in these cities is made up of corrupt dealers, but the increased enforcement in these cities sends the powerful message that selling guns is serious business, one that requires a high degree of care and responsibility on the part of the dealer.  Dealers who operate out of their homes, fail to keep proper records, or do not wish to be subjected to the increased scrutiny of local law enforcement; while not necessarily having specific criminal intent, pose a similar risk that corrupt dealers do, and should not be in business of selling guns.

 While local and state law enforcement have a fair degree of discretion to inspect and investigate FFLs, Under the McClure-Volkmer Act, also known as the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is limited to one unannounced inspection of an individual dealer in any 12-month period.  This legal protection of FFLs is enhanced by severe underfunding of ATF, leaving them with inadequate staff resources to conduct even the limited inspections that are allowed by law.  As a result, for fiscal year 1999, ATF was able to conducted only 1,700 compliance inspections, despite the fact that the number of FFLs was nearly 104,000.¹⁷  This promising enforcement strategy is left virtually untapped, except in states where state law enables inspections.

One-Gun-A-Month Laws

One of the best ways to stem the tide of guns onto the illegal market is to go straight to the source: the legal market. Virtually all guns that end up in the hands of prohibited persons enter the market legally. Law enforcement has targeted traffickers and corrupt dealers with promising results, but more proactive measures may be needed. One of the most promising of these measures is One-Gun-A-Month legislation. As the name suggests, these statutes limit the number of legal firearm purchases that an individual can make from a licensed dealer to one every 30 days. Traffickers rely upon their ability to buy large quantities of guns in single transactions on the legal market to turn profits in the illegal market, where these guns command higher prices. By prohibiting multiple purchases, One-Gun-A-Month laws have effectively removed a large part of the "profit motive" that drives traffickers. Several states have enacted such legislation, with Virginia showing the most promising results.  A 1996 study of the Virginia law demonstrated how the law resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of firearms trafficked from Virginia to other states.¹⁸  Prior to 1993, when the law took effect, Virginia dealers were a principal source of crime guns in the Northeast.  ATF data indicates that in 1991, 41% of a sample of crime guns seized in New York were traced back to dealers in Virginia. After the law took effect, the likelihood that a gun seized in the Northeast would be traced back to Virginia, as opposed to other Southeastern states with less restrictive firearm laws, fell by 66%. 

 A recent poll found that over 80% of individuals surveyed support this specific measure.¹⁹   However, only four states: California, Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia, and a handful of cities have enacted such legislation. With so few states enacting such legislation, and the absence of federal legislation, traffickers can continue to reap profits from the disparity in state gun laws, and guns will continue to find their way into the hands of those who should not have them, i.e. criminals.

Local Ordinances

Communities around the country with the ability to pass local ordinances regarding the sale, use, possession and/or ownership of firearms have enacted a number of gun related measures as a way to make their streets, homes, schools, and workplaces safer.

The effort to address the problem of gun violence through local ordinances has been most prominent in California, where 101 cities and 10 counties have enacted over 300 laws and firearm regulations as described below:²⁰

• Prohibiting the Sale of “Saturday Night Specials”: Over 50 cities and counties have enacted ordinances to ban these poorly made, easily concealed, and inexpensive guns.

• Requiring Firearms Dealers to Obtain a Local License/Permit: By subjecting firearms dealers to local licensing standards that are more stringent than the minimal requirements set forth in the state law, over 30 cities and counties have been able to prevent high risk individuals from operating firearms businesses.

• Prohibiting Firearms Dealers in Designated Areas: Over 70 cities and counties have enacted laws restricting the areas in which firearms dealers may operate. Ordinances that prohibit dealers from operating in residential zones work to limit the number of gun stores in a community and to keep high-risk “kitchen table” dealers from operating out of their homes. Prohibitions on dealers also prohibit them from operating close to schools, daycare centers, parks, recreation centers, and places of worship.

• Imposing Firearms­-Related Taxes: A handful of cities, including Oakland and Los Angeles, have imposed special taxes on firearm commerce. These taxes help to offset the financial toll that firearm violence exacts on these communities.

Other local ordinances in California have required gun dealers to carry liability insurance and maintain records of ammunition sales, have mandated background checks for employees of firearms dealers, have required that safety locks be provided with all guns sold, and have prohibited the sale of high-capacity ammunition magazines. 

California is not the only state where citizens have turned to local government for solutions, however. In Illinois, over 50 communities have enacted local ordinances regulating the commerce, possession, and use of firearms. In Toledo, Ohio, the Ohio Coalition against Gun Violence has lead the way in passing ordinances prohibiting the resale or trade of assault weapons.  Other Toledo ordinances prohibiting the possession of “Saturday night specials” and high capacity ammunition magazines, and making it a crime to leave a loaded firearm anywhere that a juvenile would be likely to gain possession of it, have also been adopted.

However, many communities, including those in Michigan, that may wish to enact ordinances to regulate the commerce, possession, and use of firearms, are prohibited from doing so by state firearm preemption laws. These laws strip local units of government of the authority to regulate firearms and firmly establish that a large degree, if not all, legislative authority over firearms rests exclusively with the state legislature. While some preemption laws leave some degree of control over firearms, such as the regulation of commerce in firearms, with the municipality, in many preemption states, “the legislature has unequivocally expressed its intent to occupy the entire area of regulation of firearms.”²¹  Michigan’s preemption statute, enacted in 1990, is quite clear in denying a local unit of government any authority in the area of firearm regulation. The law invalidated standing local ordinances in Detroit, Lansing, East Lansing, Grand Rapids, and other municipalities. 

Although the effectiveness of local ordinances, as opposed to state or federal legislation, in reducing gun violence is largely untested, strategies that have proved effective on the state or federal level are likely to have similar effects on the local level.  For example, bans on the sale of Saturday night specials, which are particularly prone to criminal use, have been shown to precipitate a decline in the criminal use of such guns.²²  Child access prevention laws and safe storage laws may be effective in the prevention of unintentional shooting deaths of children younger than 15 years old.²³  Washington, D.C. experienced a significant decline in both firearm homicides and firearms suicides after instituting a restrictive handgun licensing law.²⁴  In New York City, restrictive local licensing requirements for Federal Firearm Licensees has dramatically reduced the number of gun dealers in the city. As part of a comprehensive strategy to get guns off the streets, the licensing requirements helped to drive the number of nonfatal shootings down by 3600 between 1993 and 1997, and push the number of murders in the city under 1000 for the first time since 1968.¹²

The passage of popular and effective measures on the local level can create much needed momentum that calls state legislatures or Congress into action. Nowhere is this more apparent than in California, where four local ordinances that were adopted by numerous municipalities “trickled up” to the state level, and were passed by the legislature.

Prosecutors Holding Gun Owners Accountable

Prosecutors have been at the forefront of efforts to hold gun owners responsible for the safe storage of their firearms. In states where there are no Child Access Protection (CAP) laws, prosecutors have taken the lead on this issue by bringing charges of child abuse and reckless discharge of a firearm against irresponsible gun owners whose guns find their way into the hands of children.  In Michigan, Wayne County Prosecutor Mike Duggan has promised to crackdown on irresponsible gun owners in this manner, and has brought several such cases since taking office in January 2001.²⁵  In Genesee County, Prosecutor Arthur Busch secured an involuntary manslaughter conviction against Jamelle James, the man whose gun was used in the tragic death of Kayla Rolland.²⁶

Prosecutors have attempted to ratchet up the standard of responsibility that gun owners are held to by charging them in crimes where the gun owner’s negligent storage or transfer of a firearm leads to a crime down the line. Although attempts to prosecute individuals in this manner have proven difficult, the question of how culpable a gun owner is in criminal activity committed with a firearm no longer in the owner’s possession is one that bears examination by courts. In a recent case involving the death of a Warren, Michigan police officer, Macomb County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga brought involuntary manslaughter charges against the original owner of the gun, who had illegally transferred the weapon several years prior to the murder.²⁷  Although the charges were eventually dismissed, the prospect of gun owners being charged in this manner may also lead to legislation that gives prosecutors more firm statutory grounds to bring such charges.

Project Exile

In recent years, the courts have responded to gun violence with swift, sure, and severe penalties. By enforcing tough sentences for violent gun offenders, courts seek to send the message that if you use a gun illegally, you will go to jail.

Courts have employed two primary means to these ends. Many states enforce mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who carry or use guns in the commission of violent crimes. In addition to these stricter sentencing guidelines, gun offenders are being tried in federal court, where the penalties are far more severe, and sentences are served in far away federal prisons. The goal of this focused prosecution strategy is not only to remove violent criminals from the streets but also to deter individuals who may be likely to engage in gun violence from doing so through fear that, if caught, they will receive similar sentences.

Several states have taken this approach, following the example set by Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia.  Project Exile has been lauded by law enforcement leaders and politicians across the country as an unqualified success, largely on the basis of a dramatic drop in the number of gun homicides in Richmond since its inception and the speed and success rate with which convictions are obtained.¹²  Despite these results, Project Exile has come under fire on grounds that it unfairly targets minorities by focusing only on major urban areas and wastes tax dollars on expensive federal prosecutions in small-time cases that belong in local courts.²⁸  Project Exile is being challenged in court and U.S. District Court Justices recently concluded that while Project Exile is not unconstitutional, it does have a disproportionate impact on blacks.²⁸

Critics also point to decreases in gun crime that equal or exceed that of Richmond in cities where far less aggressive tactics were undertaken.²⁹  While Project Exile appears to be successful in removing violent criminals from the streets, its effectiveness as a deterrent is still unclear.

Court Intervention Programs

The courts have also sought alternatives to simply locking up all gun offenders. Despite recent trends toward trying juveniles as adults, courts across the country have sought to identify cases in which successful interventions can be made, and at-risk youth can be rehabilitated.

Juvenile gun crime presents its own unique set of problems. While cities such as Boston have found that a small number of particularly violent youth have been responsible for the majority of youth homicides, they have balanced the need to effectively deal with this minority with the need to identify juveniles who may benefit from alternative intervention programs. Alternative intervention programs are typically restricted to first-time, nonviolent offenders. The constant of any court intervention program is a message about the severe consequences of gun violence that seeks to deter juveniles from carrying guns. Judges, prosecutors, and police officers may instruct participants on the legal consequences of gun violence. Doctors, coroners, gunshot victims, and relatives of victims may remind participants in educational sessions that lives are at stake when they introduce a firearm into their actions. Alternative solutions to violence and peaceful mediation strategies may be taught as well. Various necessary social services may be appropriate, and family involvement is be emphasized whenever possible.

In Detroit, the Handgun Intervention Program, founded by the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department and Circuit Court Judge Willie Lipscomb, has been operating since 1993. As a condition of their bond, the program requires that offenders attend a 4-hour educational session that stresses themes of consequences, choices, responsibility, and nonviolence. Preliminary evaluation by the National Institute of Justice found that the program favorably influenced participant's attitudes about guns. Follow-up analysis reveals that the program has had no effect on recidivism. Interviews with participants suggested that while the program may have forced them to reconsider their decisions to carry guns, safety concerns were so pervasive that they felt that not arming themselves in their environment would leave them vulnerable.¹²  

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Citations: Law Enforcement Strategies

1)       Weil DS, Traffic Stop: How the Brady Act Disrupts Interstate Gun Trafficking, Center To Prevent Handgun Violence, 1997

2)       U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin, Background Checks for Firearm Transfers, 2000, July 2001

3)       Ludwig J, Cook PJ, Homicide and suicide rates associated with implementation of the Brady handgun violence prevention act, JAMA, 2000; 284(5): 585-591

4)       Weil DS, Saving Lives by Taking Guns out of Crime, Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, 2000

5)       Wright MA et al., Effectiveness of denial of handgun purchase to persons believed to be at high risk for firearm violence, American Journal of Public Health, 1999; 89:88-90

6)       Wintemute GJ et al., Prior misdemeanor convictions as a risk factor for later violent and firearm-related criminal activity among authorized purchasers of handguns, JAMA, 1998; 280:2083-2087

7)       Wintemute GJ et al., Subsequent criminal activity among violent misdemeanants who seek to purchase handguns, JAMA, 2001; 285:1019-1026

8)       Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Gun Shows: Brady Checks and Crime Gun Traces, Department of the Treasury, January 1999

9)       Americans For Gun Safety Foundation, No Questions Asked:  Background Checks, Gun Shows, and Crime, April 2001

10)    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers, Department of the Treasury, June 2000

11)    Wagner D, Sting Targets Gun Shows, The Arizona Republic, February 11, 2001

12)    U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence, February 1999

13)    Robinson-Haynes E, Wintemute GJ, Gun Confiscations: A Case Study of the City of Sacramento in 1995, Violence Prevention Research Program, University of California, Davis, 1997

14)    Wachtel J, Sources of crime guns in Los Angeles, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 1988; 21(2): 220-239

15)    Ash P et al., Gun Acquisition and Use By Juvenile Offenders, JAMA, 1996; 275 (22): 1754-1758 

16)    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in the United States, Department of the Treasury, February 2000

17)    Handgun Control and the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, The Enforcement Fable: How the NRA Prevented Enforcement of the Nation’s Gun Laws, March 21, 2000

18)    Weil DS,  Knox RC, Effects of limiting handgun purchases on interstate transfer of firearms, JAMA, 1996: 275(22): 1759-1761

19)    Teret SP et al., Support for new policies to regulate firearms: results of two national surveys, .  N Engl J Med, 1998; 339:813-818

20)    Legal Community Against Violence, Addressing Gun Violence Through Local Ordinances:  A Legal Resource Manual for California Cities and Counties, 2000 Supplement, 2000

21)    Goolsby G, Michigan Firearm Preemption Law (MCL 123.1102): Analysis of Scope, Michigan Partnership to Prevent Gun Violence, August 1999

22)    Vernick JS, et al. Effects of Maryland's law banning Saturday night special handguns on crime guns, Injury Prevention 1999; 5:259-263

23)    Cummings P et al., State gun safe storage laws and child mortality due to firearms, JAMA, 1997; 278 (13):1084-1086

24)    Loftin C et al., Effects of restrictive licensing of handguns on homicide and suicide in the District of Columbia, N Engl J Med, 1991; 325(23):1615-1620

25)    Hansen RJ, Man Charged in Unsecured Handgun Case, The Detroit News, July 24, 2001

26)    Shepardson D, Parent Charged in Child Gunfire, The Detroit News, February 21, 2001

27)    Shine KN, Judge Clears Gun Ex-Owner in Police Death, Detroit Free Press, February 16, 2001

28)    Perella D, Popular Gun Crackdown Called Racist, The Detroit News, May 31, 1999

29)    Bell D, Gun Laws’ Effect on Crime Seems Minimal, Detroit Free Press, May 31, 2000